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III.

Statement of the Case
a. Nature of the Case
The Board of County Commissioners for Bonner County, Idaho (“BOCC”)

approved variance application V-486-17 granting a request from Stejer’s Inc.
(“Stejer’s) for smaller setbacks on a piece of residential property in Coolin, Idaho
(“Disputed Property”). This approval absolved a longstanding zoning violation
which was created when the previous owner of the Disputed Property built
several structures too close to applicable property lines. Seeking to overturn the
BOCC’s decision, the Appellants (“Hungates”) initiated an appeal to the Bonner
County District Court. Following briefing and oral argument, District Judge
Cynthia K.C. Meyer affirmed the BOCC’s decision granting application V-48617, and the Appellants now appeal once more.
b. Factual and Procedural History
The Disputed Property is a cluster of three oddly-shaped lots (Tax 2, Tax
9, and Tax 10) located on the north end of Priest Lake and situated as follows:
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R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 224. Tax 2 and Tax 9 abut Priest Lake to the South. R.
Vol. 1, Ex. p. 262. Collectively, the Hungates own four lots located north and
east of the Disputed Property. Id. Thistledo Lane provides access to all relevant
lots. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 220. The property owner to the west voiced no objection to
the variance application in dispute and is not involved in this litigation.
In the late 1990’s, the Steger family patriarch erected three structures on
Tax 9 and 10 which are still there today. In 1997, he built the “Beige Structure”
on Tax 10.

R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 290. Shortly thereafter, he moved the “Yellow

Structure” onto Tax 10 and it has remained in that location ever since. Id.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

6|Page

Finally, in 1999 he constructed the “Green Structure,” which straddles the line
between Tax 9 and Tax 10. Id. Steger’s conceded from the outset that these
structures were either erected without approved building location permits or
converted to residential use without approved change-of-use permits.
When the next generation of Stegers took responsibility for the Disputed
Property circa 2015, they voluntarily reported these violations to the Bonner
County Planning Department and filed variance application V-486-17 to address
setback violations created by placing the structures in question too close to the
property lines on Tax 9 and Tax 10. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 110-11. The Hungates never
complained to Bonner County about the Disputed Property until these
proceedings took place.
Application V-486-17 sought relief from three setbacks. Stejer’s requested:
(1) a six foot rear yard setback where twenty-five (25) feet were required on the
west side of the Green Structure; (2) a seventeen (17) foot front yard setback
where twenty-five (25) feet were required on the north-east corner of the Green
Structure; and (3) a seven-foot front yard setback where twenty-five (25) feet were
required on the southeast corner of the Beige Structure where it neared Thistledo
Lane. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 218, 224. The first setback faces to the west (away from
the Hungate properties), the second is between Tax 9 and Tax 10, and the final
setback faces east toward Thistledo Lane. Id.
Following

staff

review,

the

Bonner County

Planning

Department

recommended the Planning and Zoning Committee reject application V-486-17.
R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 270. It did so, and Stejer’s initiated an appeal to the BOCC. R.
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Vol. 1, Ex. p. 266.

The BOCC approved the application and the Hungates

appealed that decision to the Bonner County District Court.
In the District Court, Bonner County conceded that the BOCC approved
application V-486-17 in error. However, Bonner County contended that the
Hungates failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice resulting from that
decision as required by I.C. § 67-5279(4) and therefore could not prevail. R. Vol.
1, p. 114. District Judge Meyer agreed that the Hungates failed to demonstrate
prejudice and affirmed the BOCC’s decision on that ground.
IV.

Issues on Appeal
a. The Hungates cannot establish prejudice to a substantial right by reliance
on alleged harms which are beyond the scope of the subject matter before
the BOCC and they have no due process right to challenge.
b. The Hungates waived the argument that other alleged harms are evidence
of devaluation and cannot raise it in this proceeding.
c. The Hungates failed to adequately show, instead of merely allege, how the
harms they incurred prejudiced their substantial rights.
d. The Hungates’ attempt to discredit the District Court’s reasoning is
unpersuasive.
e. The Hungates are not entitled to attorney’s fees.

V.

Standard of Review
“The Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”) allows an affected person to

seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided
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for in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (“IDAPA”).” Evans v. Teton Cnty.,
139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). The Court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. I.C. § 67-5279(1). Rather, the Court should defer to the agency’s findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Stevenson v. Blaine Cnty., 134 Idaho
756, 759, 9 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2000). The agency’s factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before
the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the
record. Id.
There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning
ordinances. Howard v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915
P.2d 709, 710 (1996). The Court must defer to the Board’s interpretation and
application of its zoning ordinance, unless such interpretation or application is
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.

Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999).
A Board of County Commissioners is treated as an administrative agency
for purposes of judicial review. Stevenson, 134 Idaho at 759, 9 P.3d at 1225. A
Board’s zoning decisions may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate
statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency’s statutory authority; (c) are made
upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence; or (e)
are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3).
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Any party challenging an action taken by a zoning board must show both
that the Board erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that the error
prejudiced one of the party’s substantial rights. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp.,
130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); I.C. § 67-5279(4). “Nothing in
the [IDAPA] requires the courts to address these two requirements in any
particular order.” Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 151 Idaho 228,
232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011). “This Court may therefore affirm a governing
board’s decision solely on the grounds that the petitioner has not shown
prejudice to a substantial right.” Id. “When reviewing a decision by the district
court acting in its appellate capacity under the [IDAPA], this Court analyzes the
record independently of the district court.” Id. at 231.
VI.

Argument
a. The Hungates cannot establish prejudice to a substantial right by
reliance on alleged harms which are beyond the scope to the subject
matter before the BOCC and they have no due process right to
challenge.
The Hungates list a litany of alleged harms stemming from the BOCC’s

approval of application V-486-17, including: (1) increased intensity of use and
density beyond that contemplated in an R-5 zone; (2) increased traffic volumes
on Thistledo Lane, which is used for vehicle and pedestrian access and youth
recreation; and (3) unsightly architecture out of character with the surroundings.
Appellant’s Brief at 8; R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 336.

However, these issues are not

relevant to the application at issue and the Hungates have no prejudiced right
implicated in any of them. A variance is limited in scope; it can only modify
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zoning requirements affecting the size, location, or shape of a structure. See
Bonner County Revised Code (“BCRC”) § 12-232. Increased residential use which
may become permissible as a result of a variance or the subjective attractiveness
of a structure are irrelevant when considering such an application.
So long as a property owner in Bonner County resides in a zoning district
which allows the construction of single-family dwellings, he may construct a
single-family dwelling and an attendant accessory outbuilding, including an
accessory dwelling unit (ADU) or guest home. BCRC §§ 12-332, 12-342. The
BCRC authorizes these structures as a matter of right and does not provide
neighboring landowners due process rights to contest their construction. In
addition, while the BCRC limits each dwelling unit to a single family, it does not
limit the number of people who may reside in each structure and contains no
restriction on height. BCRC §§ 12-801, 12-804. The only restriction which limits
the actual number of people on the Disputed Property is a consent order between
Stejer’s and the Panhandle Health District. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 448. However, that
agreement is already in place. It has nothing to do with setbacks on the Disputed
Property and will remain in effect regardless of the outcome of this litigation.
The combined effect of these provisions shows the futility of alleging harm
resulting from increased residential use on the Disputed Property. First, the
contention that the proposed use for the Disputed Property would violate density
requirements is simply false. Stejer’s may have one single-family dwelling and
one ADU on both Tax 9 and Tax 10 as a matter of right. Any contention to the
contrary is incorrect.
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Second, the Hungates have no right to challenge development of the
Disputed Property for residential purposes. So long as Stejer’s satisfies the
requirements to obtain change-of-use permits (or building location permits, if
they are necessary for new construction), it may develop Tax 9 and Tax 10 for
residential use as a matter of right regardless of the outcome of this case. Even
if the Hungates prevail and Stejer’s is obligated to build only within the normal
buildable envelope on the Disputed Property, it could still accommodate the
same number of bedrooms and people set forth in the Health District consent
order and the Hungates would be powerless to contest it. As such, the Hungates
cannot demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right they do not possess in the
first place.
Likewise, the Hungates claimed prejudice to a substantial right because
the structures on the Disputed Property are allegedly unsightly and out of
character with the surrounding neighborhood. However, they offer no authority
to suggest this right actually exists. Bonner County has no building department,
let alone codified aesthetic standards for residential construction. Homeowners
can build otherwise legal structures anyway they wish, and neighbors have no
right to challenge those decisions. The Hungates cannot claim prejudice to a
right that does not exist.
b. The Hungates waived the argument that other alleged harms are
evidence of devaluation and cannot raise it in this proceeding.
This Court cannot consider any issue on appeal which was not raised
below. Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d
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840, 845 (2007); Cowan v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho
501, 510-11, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256-57 (2006). When before the BOCC, the
Hungates failed to show or even allege that the approval of application V-486-17
would negatively impact their property values. The phrase “property values”
occurs one single time in the record produced at the administrative level. R. Vol.
1, Ex. p. 412. Even then, it was raised in a cursory manner by a neighbor not
party to this litigation and not addressing the Hungate properties. When ruling
in Bonner County’s favor, the District Court recognized this fact, stating:
[I]f the structures have negatively impacted Petitioners’ property
values since their construction, Petitioners should be able to show
a reduction in value at this point. Further, Petitioners did not raise
this argument before the Board; it was mentioned in one line from a
letter sent to the Board for consideration. The letter was written by
the Hungates’ neighbor and it briefly mentions property values
before moving on to concerns about increased traffic and building
density. Petitioners have failed to show how the variance will directly
impact and reduce the value of their property.
R. Vol. 1, pp. 208-9.
The Hungates alleged numerous other harms impacting their substantial
rights, but those harms were presented as separate and discrete issues without
any nexus to decreased property values. R. Vol. 1, pp. 104-105.

Perhaps

recognizing that the issue of property values was never raised at the
administrative level, counsel for the Hungates devoted the entirety of two
sentences to the issue during oral argument, then quickly turned the discussion
to the Hungates’ diminished use and enjoyment of their land. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 1415. If the Hungates had raised the argument they now rely on, the District Court
would have addressed it in its findings, but it did not do so. This implies the
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issue of property devaluation resulting from other independent harms was not
adequately raised before the District Court. That being the case, the Hungates
cannot rely on the argument now to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right.
c. The Hungates failed to adequately show, rather than merely allege,
how the harms they incurred prejudiced their substantial rights.
The Hawkins Court emphasized that a petitioner opposing the grant of a
permit must “show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her
substantial rights.” Hawkins 151 Idaho at 233. Conclusory allegations that a
petitioner is prejudiced by “noise, commercial traffic and a disproportionally
large building in a residential area” without facts and authority to support the
allegation are insufficient to satisfy this burden. Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty.
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235, 245 P.3d 983, 987 (2010).
As stated above, the Hungates have no substantial right to reduced
residential use, reduced traffic, or aesthetically pleasing buildings on the
Disputed Property. Further, they failed to raise the issue of reduced property
values before the BOCC and waived their additional arguments regarding
property values by failing to raise them before the District Court. Thus, the
remaining alleged harms in dispute are: (1) reduced privacy; (2) safety concerns;
(3) reduced enjoyment of wildlife and scenic views; and (4) impact on adjacent
wetlands and water quality. Appellant’s Brief at 8, 16.
The Hungates alleged but did not show how the remaining harms they
incurred prejudiced their substantial rights. First, there is no evidence
whatsoever in the record showing how the location of any structure on the
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Disputed Property impacts the Hungates’ privacy. The Hungates claimed they
desired to “live in a quiet, private, peaceful rural area.” R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 402.
However, they never explained how the structures on the Disputed Property
violate their privacy or how requiring Stejer’s to reduce the size of any particular
structure would alleviate the problem. It is a conclusory allegation of harm
without any factual support.
Second, the Hungates alleged that allowing the structures on the Disputed
Property to remain in their current location could prevent fire and emergency
access to properties on Thistledo Lane. R. Vol. 1, Ex. p. 394. There are two
problems with this allegation. First, the structures on the Disputed Property
have been in their current location for two decades and there is no evidence in
the record to suggest they have ever impaired access across Thistledo Lane for
anyone. Second, Bonner County routed application V-486-17 to the North
Narrows Fire District, which provides fire protection for the area. R. Vol. 1, Ex.
p. 269. The Fire District voiced no concerns with the application. Id. As with
their other allegations of harm, the Hungates failed to provide actual proof to
support this allegation, and therefore failed to show prejudice to a substantial
right.
Third, the Hungates claimed the structures on the Disputed property
reduce their ability to enjoy wildlife and scenic views on Priest Lake. R. Vol. 1,
Ex. pp. 394, 401. However, when raised before the BOCC these complaints were
centrally concerned with the large size of the structures on the Disputed Property
resulting from their height, which (1): is unrelated to the actual footprint of the

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

15 | P a g e

structures and thus irrelevant; (2) not regulated by Bonner County in any way;
and (3) would still be permissible even if Stejer’s is forced to relocate structures
on the Disputed Property. In addition, (as with all the allegations leveled by the
Hungates in this matter) the Disputed Property has existed in its present
condition for two decades. The fact that the Hungates never sought to protect
this right in all that time suggests they themselves did not deem it substantial.
Lastly, the Hungates’ allegation that granting application V-486-17 would
negatively impact adjacent wetlands and water quality is another bare allegation
without any factual support. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 341, 401, 412. There is not one
piece of evidence in the record which shows how the structures on the Disputed
Property have harmed water quality or how removing them would fix the
problem.

To the contrary, application V-486-17 was vetted by both the Idaho

Department of Environmental Resources and the Idaho Department of Water
Quality and neither entity took issue with it. R. Vol. 1, Ex. pp. 269. As such,
the Hungates failed to show prejudice to a substantial right.
The Hungates cite Price v. Payette County Board of Commissioners, 131
Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998) and Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12,
343 P.3d 41 (2015) for the proposition that “this Court has taken a commonsense approach to recognizing prejudice based on impacts to property values or
the use and enjoyment of property.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. By presenting this
argument, the Hungates are encouraging the Court to move away from the
Hawkins requirement to actually show harm and instead rely on vague notions
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of common sense to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. The Court
should refrain from doing so.
In Price, a landowner sought changes to both the zoning map and the
comprehensive plan which would allow him to build an eighty-acre subdivision
on what was once deemed “prime agricultural” land. Price 131 Idaho at 429.
The Court held this extreme change devalued a neighbor’s property and
interfered with the use and enjoyment of his land. Id. at 431. In Lusk, when a
developer received permission to construct a residential complex without enough
parking, the appellant demonstrated real, concrete harms by referencing specific
components of the plan. Lusk 158 Idaho at 19. The Court held that the bare
facts in the application presented “sufficient evidence that Lusk is in jeopardy of
economic harm from the project to satisfy the requirements set forth in
Hawkins.” Id.
Neither of the examples above resemble the case now before the Court.
Unlike Price, in which a radical change was at issue, application V-486-17 seeks
forgiveness from setbacks, nothing more. It neither changes zoning requirements
on the Disputed Property nor allows for impermissible intensity of use. Instead,
it legitimizes a land use which has existed for two decades. As such, while
common sense may have dictated the proposed land use in Price harmed the
substantial rights of neighbors, the same is not true here.
Likewise, the appellant in Lusk prevailed because it showed the harm
resulting from the project at issue; i.e. it cited the number of units to be built,
the inadequate number of corresponding parking spaces, and the costs it would
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incur knowing that the additional residents would try to park in its lots. As such,
Lusk reaffirms the Hawkins standard that an appellant must show, not just
allege, harm. In the present case, the Hungates have utterly failed to satisfy that
standard.
d. The Hungates’ attempt to discredit the District Court’s reasoning is
unpersuasive.
The District Court properly applied the Hawkins standard to show harm
when ruling in favor of Bonner County. When addressing property values, the
District Court stated:
It is important to note that these structures have been in place for
the last twenty years; if the structures have negatively impacted
property values since their construction, [the Hungates] should be
able to show a reduction in value.”
(emphasis added) R. Vol. 1, p. 181. Despite the Hungates’ claim to the contrary,
the emphasized language shows the Court focused on the difference between the
value of the Hungate properties before Stejer’s built additional structures and
afterwards when finding that Hungates failed to demonstrate reduction in
property values. See Appellant’s Brief at 13.
Likewise, when addressing the Hungates’ claims regarding diminished use
and enjoyment of their properties, the District Court rightly held that the
Hungates were primarily concerned with future construction on the Disputed
Property not associated with the approval of application V-486-17. R. Vol. 1, p.
183. This was an appropriate application of the Hawkins test which focused on
the Hungates’ failure to show harm flowing from the application itself and not
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possible harms which had not yet been realized and which the Hungates would
have no right to contest.
e. The Hungates are not entitled to attorney’s fees.
I.C. § 12-117 states in relevant part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
(Emphasis added). The Hungates do not deserve attorney fees because Bonner
County was the prevailing party in the District Court and has acted reasonably
at all times in this litigation.

From the outset, counsel for Bonner County

acknowledged the BOCC’s decision granting application V-486-17 violated I.C. §
67-5279(3) and did not waste any time on that analysis. Instead, Bonner County
focused on I.C. § 67-5279(4) and prevailed in the District Court on that basis.
Thus, not only was it reasonable to challenge the Hungates, it was just to do so.
The same logic applies here. Not only is the County’s position supported by
reasonable bases in fact and law, the County should prevail based on the record
now before the Court and established precedent. As such, the Hungates should
not be awarded attorney’s fees at any level of this litigation.
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VII.

Conclusion
Wherefore, Bonner County respectfully requests that this Court uphold

the District Court’s decision affirming the BOCC’s approval of variance
application V-486-17 and deny the Hungates’ request for attorney’s fees.
DATED this 13th
___ day of December 2018.
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Deputy Prosecutor
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